

## EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X w/o att		
2	DDCI		X "	"	
3	EXDIR		X "	"	
4	D/ICS		X "	"	
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/CCS/ICS	X			
21	ES		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		17 June			
		Date			

Remarks:

25X1

D/ Executive Secretary  
9 June 82

Date

3357 (10-81)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

11 June 1982

NOTE FOR: DDCI

FROM: DCI

*6/21/82*

John:

For your information, my reactions  
to NSA/DoD, FBI and CIA submissions to  
NSC CI study.

*C*

William J. Casey

*You have  
the 2nd  
one*

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

TOP SECRET

[illegible]

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
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OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

1-118 N55D 2-82<sup>(14)</sup>

(40)

9 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]

25X1

Chief, Community Counterintelligence Staff

[redacted]

NSSD-2 Study Director

25X1

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

National Security Study Directive 2-82

1. Last night I read the FBI document carefully and glanced through the CIA document which I will try to read more carefully tonight. Putting these disparate approaches to the problems together is going to take some organizing. The essence of the FBI perceptions can be extracted and boiled down to present a sharper picture. I have underlined and made markings on the side of critical elements which need to be preserved but you will find others. I have also raised questions and asked for more detail in various notes I made as I read along.

2. I suggest that you have somebody xerox the pages on which my notes appear, look at them and recognize where there will be a need for action.


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William J. Casey

[redacted]

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10 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:  NSSD-2/82 Study Director  
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
 SUBJECT: NSSD-2/82

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This will take a lot of picking to put together. The defense is very comprehensive and very well organized but not very specific. I found the FBI quite good. I have indicated to you some questions I raised. The CIA one is rather spotty and the point very weak, for example, the treatment of defense against active measures. It seems to me the CIA responses are the most meager compared to the range of threat with which it has to deal. One critical task which, it seems to me, will need to be addressed is a discussion of the relative significance of the various threats, i.e., espionage/SIGINT, imagery/security, etc., and the relative effectiveness and cost of the various countermeasures. Everything can't be considered. Certainly everything can't be done at once. Therefore, the things that are most critical that can be addressed the most quickly and that will counter the critical threats most effectively need to be defined and tackled first. I haven't read the State paper. I will get around to that sometime.

William J. Casey

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